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DAMAGES-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS IN THE WORKPLACE: DEFINING EXTREME
AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT IN NORTH DAKOTA'S
JOB DESCRIPTION
Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993)
I. FACTS'
In February 1986, Defendant-Appellee, Northern Crop Insurance,
Inc. (NCI),2 hired Plaintiff-Appellant, Catherine Swenson (Swenson), as a
secretary/clerk in Williston, North Dakota.' From February 1986 to
November 1986, Swenson worked closely with the office manager, Rick
Wallace (Wallace), to become familiar with the functions of the office.4 In
November, Wallace resigned from the office-manager position and rec-
ommended Swenson for the position.5 Swenson approached John Krab-
seth (Krabseth), who was the chief officer and stockholder of NCI, and
requested the opportunity to apply for the position.6 Krabseth advised
Swenson that "she need not apply because he wanted a man for the posi-
tion."7  According to Swenson, Krabseth informed her that he knew he
could hire a woman more cheaply than a man, but that he wanted to fill
the position with a young man who was fresh out of college.8 Swenson
questioned Krabseth whether his apprehension stemmed from her job
performance, and he assured her that he had no complaints about her
work but "'just need[ed] a man here.'"9 Swenson offered to take the posi-
tion for $10.00 an hour, even though Wallace received about $12.00 per
hour as office manager. 10 Krabseth responded that he felt that a woman
should not receive $10.00 per hour and that a man belonged in the man-
agement position." He felt that men should receive such a wage because
1. Because this case was reviewed on appeal from a summary judgment and order, all facts were
considered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
summary judgment, or the claimant, Ms. Swenson. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d
174 (N.D. 1993). Thus, the facts in this Comment are also presented in the light most favorable to
Swenson.
2. NCI is a North Dakota corporation which was incorporated in 1984. Brief for Appellees at 1,
Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993) (No. 920219).
3. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 176 (N.D. 1993). This was an appeal
from the second suit filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant against the Defendants-Appellees. See infra note
26 (discussing the history of this case).
4. Brief for Appellant at 6, Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993)
(No. 920219).
5. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 176.
6. Id.
7. Appellant's Brief at 6, Swenson (No. 920219).
8. Id. During the hiring period, Swenson also overheard conversations between Wallace and
Krabseth in which Krabseth insisted he wanted to hire a young man for the position, disregarding
Wallace's advice that Swenson was the most qualified for the position. Id.
9. Aprellant's Brief at 7, Swenson (No. 920219) (quoting the defendant).
10. Id.11. Id. See also Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 176 (N.D. 1993).
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men have families to support but that a woman simply should not get paid
that much.' 2
In spite of Krabseth's resistance, Swenson submitted her application
to the Board of Directors, and, notwithstanding Krabseth's objections to
hiring a woman, was hired as office manager at $10.00 per hour on
December 3, 1986.13 Following Swenson's appointment, Krabseth alleg-
edly continued to make derogatory and sexist comments, persisted that he
needed a man in the management position, and vocalized his plans to
restructure the office by creating positions for a computer operator and a
program specialist.14 He always spoke in the context that he needed men
to fill the positions.15
On January 20, 1987, Krabseth demoted Swenson back to secretary/
clerk at $6.00 per hour and informed her that as a component of his reor-
ganization plan, he would be hiring a man at a higher wage. 16 After
Swenson's demotion, the Board of Directors responded to the plans
spearheaded by Krabseth and restructured NCI's personnel system.'"
Swenson was not given notice of the new positions and, thus, did not have
the opportunity to apply.'"
After being exposed to the alleged gender discrimination, Swenson
claimed that agony permeated her life.' 9 Swenson was a recovering alco-
holic and felt herself being lured to alcohol; yet, she did not succumb to
the temptation.20 Swenson stated that Krabseth was aware of her deterio-
rating emotional condition because he knew that she began attending
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings over her lunch hour so that she could
remain alcohol-free.2'
Eventually, Krabseth gave Swenson the "silent treatment" by
refraining from speaking with her, refusing to discuss her employment
12. Id. Swenson informed Krabseth that she was a single mother and had children to support,
but Krabseth was unmoved by this information. Id. at 182.
13. Id. at 176. Even though Swenson earned more as a result of her promotion from secretary/
clerk, which was paid $7.50 per hour, to office manager, which was paid $10.00 per hour, she earned
approximately $5,000 per year less than Wallace had made in the office-manager position. Id.
14. Id.
15. Appellant's Brief at 8, Swenson (No. 920219).
16. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 176. The Board of Directors later remedied the salary decrease by
reinstating the $7.50 per hour salary, which Swenson had previously earned as secretary/clerk, and
stating that the $6.00 per hour salary was an error. Id. at 183 n.6.
17. Appellee's Brief at 3, Swenson (No. 920219). Krabseth was commissioned as the manager;
Tom Hove (Hove) was hired as a training and prorm specialist; and Terry Skarphol (Skarphol) was
hired as an accountant and computer operator. Id. at 2-3.
18. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 183. Swenson claimed that she was qualified to fill the computer
operator position, but she was demoted "to answering the phone, typing, and filing for two men in
positions that her former position had been equal to or greater than in status." Id.
19. Appellant's Brief at 10, Swenson (No. 920219).
20. Id.
21. Id. Swenson argued that Krabseth was aware of her condition because she requested a
lunch hour extended by five to ten minutes so that she could attend the Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 176-77.
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with NCI, and avoiding any contact with her. 2 On March 13, 1987,
Swenson resigned as an employee of NCI because of her deteriorating
physical and mental condition and the stress generated by Krabseth's
conduct.23
Subsequently, Swenson brought suit in Williams County District
Court against NCI and Krabseth alleging gender discrimination, 24 viola-
tions of the North Dakota Equal Pay Act,25 and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 26 The trial court granted Defendants-Appellees sum-
mary judgment on each claim.2 7 Although Swenson appealed each sum-
mary judgment to the North Dakota Supreme Court, this Comment is
confined to the issue of whether the trial court appropriately granted
Defendants-Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim .2  The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the decision of the trial court, holding that
the determination of conduct as extreme and outrageous does not rest on
the actor's conduct alone, but rather, the conduct must be considered in
conjunction with the existence of an employment relationship and knowl-
edge of susceptibility.2 9
II. LEGAL HISTORY
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a modem tort that was
delineated primarily by legal scholars who observed that courts occasion-
ally awarded compensation for mental anguish.30 The legal scholars
22. Id. at 183.
23. Appellant's Brief at 10, Swenson (No. 920219). By November 1987, Swenson had
deteriorated to the point in which representatives of the Human Service Center had found her
cowering between vending machines. Id. Swenson eventually placed herself into treatment at an
addiction center and completed the program by December 1987. Id.
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
25. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 34-06.1 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
26. Appellant's Brief at 5, Swenson (No. 920219). Prior to filing in Williams County District
Court, Swenson filed a gender discrimination complaint with the North Dakota Labor Commission.
Id. at 4. The Commission denied her complaint. Id. Swenson appealed and was issued a 'Notice of
Right to Sue" letter. Id. Swenson filed a complaint in the United States District Court, District of
North Dakota. Appendix for Appellee at 157, Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174
(N.D. 1993) (No. 920219). The United States District Court dismissed Swenson's complaint because
the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellees' Brief at 1, Swenson (No. 920219).
27. Appellant's Brief at 5, Swenson (No. 920219).
28. Id. at 2.
29. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 186 (N.D. 1993).
30. See generally Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Wdliam L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MicH. L. REV. 874 (1939) [hereinafter Prosser, A New Tort]; William L. Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1956) [hereinafter Prosser, Insult and Outrage]. See also Daniel
Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 42 (1982) (stating
that the tort was developed largely by legal scholars, rather than by the courts).
19941
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:187
urged such compensation for emotional distress and defined a tort which
is now recognized by courts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 1
Courts have been cautious to accept freedom from mental distress as
an independent legal protection. 2 This modem tort was not recognized
by English common law courts nor early American courts.' In the 1930s,
the Restatement of Torts34 reflected courts' reluctance to recognize a legal
protection for peace of mind and a duty not to cause mental distress by
expressly rejecting liability for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress except in cases of assault or special carrier liability for insult.'
Magruder and Prosser were leading scholars who criticized the 1934
Restatement.3 They demonstrated that courts had previously provided
recovery for emotional distress, bringing forth cases such as Wilkinson v.
Downton, 7 described as the leading case that "broke through the
shackles of the old law." s Courts particularly permitted recovery by con-
sidering relief for distress a "parasitic" damage.39 For example, if a claim-
31. See supra note 30 (citing scholarly articles which urged the adoption of the independent
tort). See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 66 (Cal. 1979) (acknowledging the right to relief for
emotional distress alone); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 146 (recognizing an
independent tort claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress).
32. See Roberts v. Saylor, 637 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Kan. 1981) (recognizing courts' hesitation to
accept independent legal protection from mental distress even when the plaintiff was intentionally
invaded). See also W. PACE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at
55 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the law has been slow to recognize protection for freedom from
emotional distress).
33. See Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 953 (Idaho 1980) (describing
the reluctance to recognize claim and citing Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861) and Allsop v.
Allsop, 157 Eng. Rep. 1292 (1861)). See also 4 STUART M. SPEISER ST AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF
TORTS § 16:33, at 1014 (1983 and Supp. 1993) (describing the development of the tort).
34. Restatement of Torts § 46 (1934).
35. Id. Comment c of the Restatement provided that the "interest ... in freedom from mental
and emotional disturbance is not ... regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain
from conduct intended or recognizably ikely to cause such a disturbance." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 46 cmt. c (1934). See Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Wash. 1977)
(describing-the evolution of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46).
36. See supra note 30 (providing sources which question the accuracy of the Restatement's
summary of the law).
37. [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57.
38. Magruder, supra note 30, at 1045 (describing Wilkinson as a classic example of aggression
directed specifically at the plaintiff); Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 30, at 881 (describing
Downton's conduct as an unusually heartless kind); Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57. In
Wilkinson, the defendant was held liable for the emotional distress he caused when as a practical joke
he told the plaintiff that her husband had been injured in an accident and was in the hospital with two
broken legs. Id. at 58. KEETON ST AL., supra note 32, at 60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 cmt d, illus. 1 (1965); SPEISER ET AL., supra note 33, at 1015 n.9 (labeling Wilkinson as the
leading early case allowing recovery).
For other cases first recognizing recovery for emotional distress, see Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So.
37, 38-39 (La. 1920) (allowing recovery when the insane plaintiff was subjected to mental distress
when practical jokesters buried a "pot of gold" knowing that plaintiff would open the treasure in front
ofa gathering, but only dirt was found in the pot; so plaintiff was convinced that she had been robbed
untifher death); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 153 A. 22 (Md. 1931) (allowing plaintiff
recovery for physical injuries caused by shock of fright when plaintiff opened a package that she
thought was bread, but instead was a dead rat that was packaged by the defendant and intended for
the plaintiff).
39. Magruder, supra note 30, at 1049 (considering damages "parasitic" because they were
permitted ifthey could be brought with a conceivably recognized tort). Magruder noted that an
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ant brought a claim for a recognized tort such as a battery, the claimant
could recover for emotional distress stemming from the battery.40  Pros-
ser urged the courts to abandon their "parasitic" damage approach and to
recognize an independent tort claim.41
The writers of the Restatement reconsidered and reversed their posi-
tion in 1948 by recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as
an independent tort.42 The 1965 Restatement retained the 1948 position
and maps the elements of the tort which have been adopted by courts.4
established rule was recognized and set forth in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS J 47(b) that if an actor is
liable for an invasion of a legally protected interest of another, emotional distress caused by such
conduct may be considered when assessing damages. Id. Thus the damages were "parasitic" to an
already protected interest. Id. If some independent tort could be fashioned, no matter how
technical, there was an actionable claim and a peg upon which to hang mental damages that allowed
courts to freely permit recovery. Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 30, at 880.
40. See Gadsden General Hospital v. Hamilton, 103 So. 553, 554 (Ala. 1925) (allowing recovery
for emotional distress for the false imprisonment of the plaintiff); Valencia v. Milliken, 160 P. 1086,
1088 (Cal. Ct. App. 1916) (permitting the plaintiff recovery for mental suffering caused by rape);
Kline v. Kline, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (Ind. 1902) (holding that the plaintiff may recover damages for
emotional distress caused by an assault); Sturgeon v. Sturgeon, 30 N.E. 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 1892)
(allowing full compensation for mental pain the plaintiff directly suffered as a result of assault and
battery).
The recognition of emotional distress, even secondarily, was an important stage in the evolution
of the tort because, as a scholar prophetized, the treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic
factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution which will soon be recognized as an
independent basis of liability. Magruder, supra note 30, at 1049 (citing 1 STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL LIABILrry 470 (1906)); Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 30, at 880 (citing 1 STREET, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906)).
41. Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 30, at 881. Proponents of providing independent protection
for freedom from emotional distress considered reasons for not adopting such protections, but found
them unconvincing. See, e.g., id. at 875-79. Prosser recognized the difficulty of valuation of
emotional damages, but he noted that this difficulty existed regardless of the existence of actual
physical injury. Id. at 875. Therefore, he.concluded, the difficulty of valuing emotional damages was
an unpersuasive reason to deny damages in one case while granting them in the other. Id. Prosser
also reasoned that the fear of inviting a flood of litigation for triviaand fraudulent claims could not
properly keep the courts from recognizing a separate claim for emotional damages. Id. at 877. He
opined that the law must provide remedies for deserving wrongs, regardless of the amount of work for
the courts. Id. Prosser was confident that the inherent checks in the judicial process would minimize
the speculated difficulties. Id. at 878.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 18-21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957) (providing the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948)). The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
acknowledged the rapid development of the "new tort- and the need for a more limited statement
which would set boundaries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957). The
tort has become known as the intentional infliction of emotional distress or, in some jurisdictions, as
the tort of outrage. See, e.g., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Wash. 1977)
(referring to such a claim as the tort of outrage).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 146 (1965). The Restatement essentially outlines four
elements of the tort: (1) the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct must be
extreme and outrageous, and (3) the conduct must be the cause of (4) severe emotional distress. Id.
See also Givelber, supra note 30, at 46 (summarizing the tort's elements).
Even though many courts adopt all of the elements of the Restatement, Givelber states in his
article that the extreme and outrageous component is essentially the entire tort. Id. The tort is
purported to combine both intentional and unintentional torts by requiring the complainant to show a
palpable injury which is reminiscent of negligence or unintentional tort, rather than just an awareness
of injury, Which is reminiscent of intentional tort. id. at 50. Givelber's collapse of the elements and
focus on the actor's extreme and outrageous conduct extinguish the negligence aspect and merge the
tort into a single issue: whether conduct is extreme and outrageous. Id. at 51.
The emphasis on the intentional aspect of the tort has made the suit less expensive than a
negligence claim; experts are not needed to show causation or extent of injury because the extremity
and outrageousness of the conduct presumes damage. Id. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l
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The second Restatement supplied a caveat which urged that development
of the tort should not be hindered.'
Notwithstanding the caveat which has successfully encouraged the
development of the tort, limitations have been incorporated to impede
expansion of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The pri-
mary limitation has been the extreme and outrageous conduct
requirement.4
Independent liability occurs only when the defendant's conduct rises
to the level of extreme and outrageous, even though the defendant's con-
duct might be intentionally tortious, criminal, malicious, or of the sort
entitling the plaintiff to punitive damages.46 Liability has been found only
where the conduct is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized [society].,' t
The element of extreme and outrageous conduct has been characterized
as circumstances in which a "recitation of the facts to an average member
of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead
him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!"'8
Prosser states that there are two reasons for the extreme and outra-
geous conduct limitation.49 One is that the "rough edges of our society"
require plaintiffs to withstand a certain amount of inconsiderate and
unkind acts since the law does not afford a remedy for all harmful or
trivial acts.5° There must still be a liberty to express an unflattering opin-
Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8 (Md. 1992) (citing Givelber's theory that the tort has
been reduced to a single element). But see Buckley v. Trenton Savings Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 865
(N.J. 1988). The Buckley court decided that the emotional distress was not severe and, therefore, did
not address the outrageous conduct element. Id. The court reasoned that each prong of the tort
must be met before relief may be granted. Id.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). The caveat encouraged development of the
tort because the law in this area was in the stage of growth and the limits of the tort had not been
determined. Id. at cmt. c.
45. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 30, at 43; Prosser, A New Tort, supra note 30, at
888.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra
note 30, at 44. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8,
17-18 (Md. 1992) (Bell, J., dissenting) (clarifying that the jurisdiction had adopted the language of
comment d).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra
note 30, at 44. See, e.g., Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (I11. A pp. Ct. 1990) (citing
comment d and finding that defendant's acts and their cumulative efect could constitute
outrageousness to a reasonable jury).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra
note 30, at 44 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (Supp. 1948)). See, e.g., Beeman v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 674, 680 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing comment d).
49. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 30, at 44.
50. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). See, e.g., Lagies v.
Copley, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (citing comment d).
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ion"' and to require "a certain toughening of the mental hide," because
the law will not intervene every time someone's feelings are hurt.52 Soci-
ety must allow "safety valves through which irascible tempers might
legally blow off steam."''
Prosser's second reason for the extreme and outrageous conduct lim-
itation is that instances of petty insult, indignity, and annoyance or threat
lack the assurance that genuine emotional distress occurred or, if genuine,
that the distress was of the severity to warrant compensation.' Lines
must be drawn to determine recovery.55 The line has been drawn at the
threshold of extreme outrage for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.56
The Restatement recounted the roles of the court and jury when
applying the elements of the tort.57 The court first decides whether a jury
could reasonably determine the defendant's conduct to be so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery.58 Where reasonable minds could differ,
the jury determines whether the particular circumstances give rise to suf-
ficiently extreme and outrageous conduct as to result in liability for the
defendant.5 ' The Restatement's suggested role for the court has been
criticized, however. In Wornick v. Casas, ° the concurrence expressed
that there were no legal standards by which a court could distinguish con-
duct which was outrageous from conduct which was not outrageous."'
The concurrence in Wornick predicted that many courts would embark
on an "endless wandering over a sea of factual circumstances ... blown
about by bias and inclination, and guided by nothing steadier than the
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra
note 30, at 44. See, e.g., Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d 916, 927 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that there
must still be room to express an unflattering opinion and adopting comment d).
52. Magruder, supra note 30, at 1035. See, e.g., Agarwal v.Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 67 (Cal. 1979)
(stating that there is no occasion to intervene each time one's feelings are hurt).
53. Magruder, supra note 30, at 1053. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d
(1965).
54. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 30, at 44-45. Prosser provides an example where
one who had been called a "son of a bitch" claimed that his health was permanently impaired because
of the expression. Id. at 45. Prosser recognized that others who have been called the same without
sigficant impairment would have legitimate doubts as to whether such harm merited compensation.
I. See, e.g., Caldor v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959, 963 (Md. 1993) (recognizing inherent problems with
distingishing a "true claim" from a false one and separating the "trifling annoyance" from the serious
wrong).
55. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, supra note 30, at 45.
56. Id.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965). See, e.g., In re Grimm, 784 P.2d
1238, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (indicating that the jurisdiction had previously adopted the
Restatement's role for the court).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965).
59. Id.
60. 856 S.w.2d 732 (Tex. 1993).
61. Wornick v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring).
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personal preferences of [those guarding the helm] who change [course]
with every watch."62
An indication that conduct is extreme and outrageous may arise from
an abuse of the defendant's position, or specifically, the defendant's rela-
tionship with the plaintiff, which may give the defendant an actual or
apparent authority over the plaintiff.63 Examples of possible relationships
in which an abuse of a position may make the defendant liable are abuses
of authority by police officers, school officials,' landlords,' and collect-
ing,creditors. 66 While the Restatement's examples of relationships do not
include the employment relationship between an employer and an
employee, or a supervisor and a subordinate, many jurisdictions have con-
sidered the employment relationship as a factor when determining
whether the defendant's conduct is outrageous.67 Courts have been cau-
tious to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress in the work-
place because "[t]he workplace is not always a tranquil world where
civility reigns" and conflict can be expected because the interaction
62. Id. at 737.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965). Prior to the recognition of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the leading case of a defendant's abuse of some
relationship with the plaintiff was Janvier v. Sweeney, [19191 2 K.B.D. 316, in which the defendant,
who was a private detective, represented himself as a police officer and threatened to charge the
plaintiff with espionage unless she surrendered evidence in her possession. Presser, Insult and
Outrage, supra note 30, at 47-48 (citing Janvier v. Sweeney, [1919] 2 K.B. 316). Another case prior to
the recognition of the tort was Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926), in which school
officials threatened to send a high school girl to reform school unless she falsely confessed to sexual
intercourse with various men. Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 815 (Minn. 1926); but see Walker
v. Tucker, 295 S.W. 138, 139 (Ky. 1927) (denying recovery for emotional distress to a school girl
plaintiff when the defendant intended to humiliate and shame the plaintiff by calling her a bastard to
teachers, classmates, and people in the community). Recovery for emotional distress was allowed in
Janvier and Johnson, and each was incorporated into the second Restatement's illustrations of when
abuse of a relationship or position may indicate extreme and outrageous conduct. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e, illus. 5 & 6 (1965).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965). See, e.g., Rudis v. National College
of Education, 548 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (noting comment e in regard to school
authorities, but stating that plaintiff was not a young school girl but was a career woman who was not
bullied or threatened with public disgrace).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965). See Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rptr.
650, 652 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (recognizing that landlords have been held to be in a position of
authority and that the landlord/tenant relationship was a factor to consider); Ruane v. Murray, 380
N.W.2d 362, 364 (S.D. 1986) (citing comment e when a tenant brought a claim against a landlord for
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965). See, e.g., Bundren v. Superior Court
of County of Ventura, 193 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that although the
creditor possesses a qualified privilege to protect an economic interest, the creditor may be liable for
outrageous conduct, particularly when the creditor is aware of the debtor's susceptible condition).
67. See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1350 (Colo. 1988) (recognizing that
outrageous conduct may occur in the employment situation); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245,1251 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (recognizing that, particularly because of the threat of job loss, the impact of
outrageous conduct is exacerbated when the defendant is also plaintiffs employer). See also SPEISER
x'r. At.., supra note 33, § 16:21, at 1094 (stating that some courts have considered the employment
relationship a significant factor in determining liability). But see Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co.,
548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 521 (App. Div. 1989) (failing to consider the employment relationship as a factor).
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between employers and employees is different than that between "friends
at a summer picnic. "6s
Another indication that conduct is extreme and outrageous may arise
from the defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible
to emotional distress because of a physical or mental condition.6" Con-
duct continued with the knowledge of plaintiffs susceptibility "may
become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous," while it may not have 'been
had the defendant not known of the plaintiffs susceptibility."0 The his-
torically leading case in which the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiffs
susceptibility to emotional distress was relevant in the determination of
whether recovery would be allowed was Nickerson v. Hodges,"' which
involved an insane plaintiff who was subjected to emotional distress when
practical jokesters buried a "pot of gold" knowing that, in front of a crowd,
the plaintiff would open the "treasure" only to find dirt.7' For the
remainder of her life, the plaintiff was convinced that she had been
robbed. 3
The tort has also been applied in cases in which alleged workplace
discrimination has occurred, but jurisdictions have reached varied results
in determining whether the alleged discrimination is extreme and outra-
geous.74 The jurisdictions' varying results stem from the courts' prelimi-
68. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 16 (Md. 1992).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 46 cmt. f (1965).
70. id.
71. 84 So. 37 (La. 1920).
72. Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 38-39 (La. 1920).
73. Id. Nickerson was incorporated into the Restatement's illustrations of when knowledge of
laintif's susceptibility may demonstrate outrageous conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
46 cmt. f, illus. 9 (1965). See Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 597 A.2d 846, 848 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1991) (citing comment f and onsidering the supervisor's knowledge of the employee's alcoholism as
knowledge of the employee's susceptibility to distress). But see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743
S.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Ark. 1988) (holding that even though defendant had knowledge of plaintiff's
susceptibility due to a recent divorce, the conduct did not rise to the sufficient level because the law
"does not open the [courtroom] doors .. . [for] every slight insult or indignity").
74. See linebaugh v. Sheraton Michigan Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant when a sexually
compromising cartoon of the female plaintiff and a male co-employee was circulated in the
workplace); Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 835 P.2d 720, 722, 728 (Mont. 1992) (recognizing that a
directed verdict on the independent tort was inappropriate when the plaintiff was sexually harassed
and fondled at work); Kryeskd v. Schott Glass Technologies, 626 A.2d 595, 597-98 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (stating that the general rule in Pennsylvania is that sexual harassment alone does not rise to the
level of outrageousness necessary to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). But
see Gaiters v. Lynn, 831 F.2d 51, 53-54 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a country-western singer's racial
allusions directed at an employee of the concert hall were not sufficient to maintain a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because, when taken in context, the defendant's words
were not deemed by the court to be explicit or meanspirited, but were merely of the inconsiderate
kind that did not rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Hendrix v. Phillips,
428 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that a co-employee's acts, such as his depicting
fecal matter moving through a colon, showing a hole in his crotch and requesting co-employee
plaintiff to staple it shut, and gesturing in a lewd-manner, were not sufficient to constitute a pattern of
outrageous harassment but were merely tasteless and rude); Shea v. Cornell Univ., 596 N.Y.S.2d 502,
504 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that while discriminatory conduct was unacceptable and socially
repugnant, it did not rise to the level of atrocity).
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nary determinations of the "prevailing norms of society."' When a court
determines that society should tolerate a defendant's conduct, it will grant
summary judgment to the defendant; thus, whether summary judgment is
avoided depends on the court's interpretation of societal tolerance. 6
Since the 1915 decision of Wilson v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co.,77
North Dakota courts have recognized a commitment to protecting one's
freedom from emotional distress.78 North Dakota juries were allowed to
consider mental anguish when determining compensatory damages,79 but
it was not until 1989 in Muchow v. Lindblads° that the North Dakota
Supreme Court recognized the intentional infliction of emotional distress
as an independent tort. 1
Muchow set forth three elements of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress.82 Recovery is available when the defendant acts
with "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct that is (2) intentional or reck-
less and that causes (3) severe emotional distress."8' The North Dakota
75. King v. Kidd, Nos. 90-CV-1621, 91-CV-283, 1993 WL 326062, at 12 (D.C. Aug. 26, 1993)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) and recognizing that what was considered
trivial fifty years ago may be considered outrageous under today's socialstandards).
76. See generally supra note 74 (citing cases from courts which have either gted or denied
summay judgment on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). The judiciay
increasingly acknowledges society's awareness of "subtle and not so subtle" gender discrimination.King v. Kidd, Nos. 90-CV-1621, 91-CV-283, 1993 WL 326062, at *20 (D.C. Aug. 26, 1993). This
increased sensitivity has elevated conduct involving gender discrimination "from 'petty oppression' to
outrageous and intolerable conduct." Id. (citingRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS . 46 (1965)).
Courts have recognized changing social conditions when determining whether conduct including
racial epithets might be considere outrageous. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173,
1177 (Wash. 1977) (citing Alcorn v. Anhro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219 n.4 (Cal. 1970)).
When courts recognize changing interpretations of societal norms, they are more apt to deny
summary judgment and permit the plaintiff to present his or her facts to a jury. See supra note 74.
77. 153 N.W. 429 (N.D. 1915).
78. Wilson v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 153 N.W. 429, 435 (N.D. 1915). In Wilson, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff could not recover without the presence of an injury other than
fright. Id. at 435. The Norh Dakota Supreme Court stated that "[flortunately for the progress of the
human race, we. . . are not jellyfish, but human beings ... gifted with nerves and with feelings, and
the law must be administered upon this assumption." Id.
79. See, e.g., Binstock v. Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 463 N.W.2d 837, 842 (N.D. 1990)
(reiterating that a jury may properly consider "wounded feelings, mental suffering, humiliation,
degradation, and disgrace" when determining compensatory damages). The North Dakota
Legislature incorporated damages for mental anguish and emotional distress into North Dakota
Century Code section 32-03.2-04 as noneconomic damages. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (2)
(Supp. 1993) (providing economic and noneconomic damages for wrongful death or injury to person).
See also Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co., 430 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1988) (applying section 32-03.2-04 in a
wrongful death action).
80. 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989).
81. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 1989). While Muchow was the first time
that the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the tort, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized in Hanke v. Global Van Lines, Inc., 533 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1976) the North Dakota
Federal District Court's assumption that North Dakota would follow the trend and recognize such a
tort.
82. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 923-24.
83. Id. at 924. The Muchow court provided that the degree of outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct may be considered in the determination of the severity of the emotional distress.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmts, & k (1965)). Although the plaintiffs in
Muchow suffered from sleep loss and weight loss, the Nor Dakota Supreme Court did not require
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Supreme Court in Muchow focused on the threshold element of extreme
and outrageous conduct and instituted a seemingly stringent precedent s4
The contemporary tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
has experienced tensions in its relatively limited history. Because of the
functional nature of the tort, courts have applied the tort to various con-
texts, but jurisdictions have deviated in their application of the tort's ele-
ments, particularly when defining the extreme and outrageous conduct
element of the tort. Some jurisdictions have rigidly applied the tort's ele-
ments to a set of facts with a historical definition of extreme and outra-
geous conduct."' Other jurisdictions, however, have been more liberal in
their application of the tort's elements, defining extreme and outrageous
conduct by society's contemporary perception of tolerance.86 Jurisdic-
tions' varying applications of the tort's elements affect intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims. A jurisdiction's requirements for a
showing of extreme and outrageous conduct strongly indicate who will
bodily harm to the plaintiffs as a prerequisite for recovery; rather, emotional anxiety was sufficient to
satisy the distress element. Id. at 919, 924.
The North Dakota Supreme Court looks at the degree of outrageousness of conduct to
determine the presence of severe emotional distress. Id. at 924. This fosters two interpretations.
One interpretation is that, contrary to Daniel Givelber's hypothesis, the North Dakota Supreme
Court requires a showing of severe emotional distress. See Givelber, supra note 43 (discussing
Givelber's hypothesis). Therefore, consistent with this interpretation, the tort in North Dakota has
not been diluted to the sole element of extreme and outrageous conduct. The second interpretation
is that if the defendant's conduct is so extreme and outrageous, the seventy of the emotiona distress
suffered by the plaintiff is self-evident. See id. (discussing Givelber's hypothesis). This interpretation
holds true to Givelber's hypothesis that when the court tocuses on the degree of outrageousness and
allows it to prove severe emotional distress, the tort solely resembles an intentional tort and sheds its
unintentional tort characteristics, such as requiring proof of causation. Id. This result makes an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim inviting to plaintiffs because the cost of litigation is
significantly reduced. Id.
The second interpretation is more likely to be the case in North Dakota, particularly since the
North Dakota Supreme Court has outlined three elements to the tort, rather than four. Muchow, 435
N.W.2d at 924. By combining the causation element with the intent element, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has reduced the tort to intent, conduct, and result, which are reminiscent of
intentional tort. See id. This reduction eliminated proof of causation, which was the unintentional
aspect of the tort. See idL Thus, Givelber's hypothesis seems evident in North Dakota. See Givelber,
supra note 43.
Prior to the Restatement, many jurisdictions required a physical impact by the defendant, but by
the 1930s, the trend was to eliminate the impact requirement as long as there was outrageous conduct
which resulted in the severe emotional distress. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Max Rouse and Sons Northwest,
606 P.2d 944, 953 (Idaho 1980) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948)).
84. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 924. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48, 50-51 (outlining the
Restatement's comments adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court).
In Muchow, the plaintiffs were family members of a woman whose body was found in a river.
Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 919. The plaintiffs filed suit against the investigating officer for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because without conducting any serious investigation and despite
obvious signs of foul play, the officer immediately concluded that the death was a suicide. Id. The
officer described the "grim details" of the suicide, and after the plaintiffs challenged his findings, he
accused the plaintiffs of merely appeasing their guilt for not giving the victim support and love while
she was alive. Id. The Muchow court denied recovery and concluded that the summary judgment
was properly granted because reasonable persons could not differ as to whether the investigating
officer's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Id. at 925.
85. See generally supra notes 74-76 (discussing courts' varying results after applying the tort's
extreme and outrageous conduct element).
86. Id.
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prevail upon a motion for summary judgment. The North Dakota
Supreme Court has recently delineated the underlying factors which com-
prise extreme and outrageous conduct in the workplace in Swenson v.
Northern Crop Ins., Inc. 7
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc.,8 the North Dakota
Supreme Court addressed the independent legal protection of emotional
well-being in the workplace by expanding and clarifying the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.8 9 The court expanded the applica-
tion of the tort to the workplace and clarified the prerequisites necessary
to avoid summary judgment based on extreme and outrageous conduct."
In Swenson, the Defendants-Appellees argued that summary judgment
was proper because Swenson had not established the first element of the
tort set forth in Muchow v. Lindblad,91 extreme and outrageous
conduct. 92
Former Chief Justice Erickstad,93 who wrote for the court, imple-
mented the Muchow standard to determine whether the trial court's sum-
mary judgment was appropriate.94 In finding that the summary judgment
ruling was unsuitable for the circumstances involved in Swenson, the
court stated that the focus should not be exclusively on the defendant's
allegedly discriminatory conduct and words. 5 In addition to the allegedly
discriminatory conduct, the court considered the context and background
of the conduct, or the presence of a relationship and knowledge of plain-
tiffs susceptibility to distress, to determine whether reasonable minds
could differ as to whether conduct was extreme and outrageous. 6 The
court underscored the danger of viewing the allegedly discriminatory con-
duct in a vacuum, detached from the surroundings in which it occurred.97
Former Chief Justice Erickstad regarded the employer-employee
relationship as a factor to consider when determining the outrageousness
87. 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993).
88. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84 (discussing the Muchow standard as invoked in
Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989)).
92. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 181.
93. Id. at 176. Justice Ralphi. Erickstad was Chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court
at the time that Swenson was heard and served as Surrogate Judge pursuant to North Dakota Century
Code section 27-17-03 (1991). Id. at 176 n.1.
94. Id. at 181.
95. d.
96. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 110-114 (discussing Justice Levine's suggestion
that mere gender discrimination may be sufficient to avoid summary judgment).
97. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 186.
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of conduct and adopted the Restatement's comment e,9 8 even though the
comment does not refer to an employment context as an example of a
relationship that may give rise to an abuse of authority.'
In conjunction with the allegedly discriminatory conduct and the
employment relationship, the court found significant the defendant's
knowledge of plaintiffs particular susceptibility to emotional distress and
adopted the Restatement's comment f.l' While the defendant's knowl-
edge was not per se conclusive for the court, the knowledge was relevant
in determining whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous.' °'
In reaching its decision, the court recognized that, in the characteri-
zation of outrageousness and the degree of outrageousness necessary to
avoid summary judgment, jurisdictions have addressed the element of
extreme and outrageous conduct differently.10 Although jurisdictions
have generally allowed judges to initially determine whether reasonable
98. Id. at 185. See supra note 63-67 and accompanying text (stating that comment e of the
Restatement provides that when the defendant holds a position of authority or relationship, either
actual or implied, abuse of such authority goes to the extremity and outrageousness of the defendant's
conduct).
99. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 185. Even though the Restatement did not refer to the
employment relationship, the court recognized that other jurisdictions have expanded the
Restatement's rationale to an employment context and adopted the same approach. Id. See Agarwal
v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 66-67 (Cal. 1979) (considering an employment relationship when an
employer shouted racial epithets at an employee); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216,
217-219 (Cal. 1970) (stating that the plaintiffs employee status entitled the plaintiff to a greater
degree of protection from insult than would have been entitled to a stranger when defendant shouted
slurs such as "goddam niggers" at the plaintiff); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 228 Cal. Rptr.
591, 603 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the employment relationship aggravated the
circumstances surrounding the racial slurs and epithets); Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d 916, 922 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1982) (stating that the relative positions of the parties were important considerations when, in a
five to fifteen minute tirade, the employer repeatedly called the plaintiff slurs such as "fucking spic);
Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 14-15 (Md. 1992)
(recognizing the employment relationship as a factor to consider when determining the
outrageousness of the conduct); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wash.
1977) (determining that when one in a position of authority makes racial slurs, jokes, and comments,
the abusive conduct gives added impetus to the outrageousness of the conduct. But see Ramirez v.
Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that a young person
replacing an elderly employee who was divested of his seniority was nothing more than an "ordinary
employment dispute" and the employment relationship was not given special consideration). See also
supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the application of comment e to various
relationships, including the employment relationship).
100. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 186. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (stating that
comment f provides that when the defendant has knowledge of plaintiffs susceptible condition, such
knowledge goes to the outrageousness of the conduct).
101. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 186. For cases that consider a defendant's knowledge of plaintiffs
susceptibility in the workplace, see Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir.
1991) (taking into account the plaintiffs susceptibility when the defendant refused to file a requested
grievance for racial discrimination); Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 67 (Cal. 1979) (showing that
racial epithet was said knowingly to humiliate); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218
n.3, 219 n.4 (Cal. 1970) (noting the particular susceptibility of a racial minority to discriminatory
conduct which is personified by the civil rights movement); Robinson v. Hewlett Packard Corp., 228
Cal. Rptr. 591, 604 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a racial minority may be susceptible to
racial slurs). See also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
comment f when defendant has knowledge of plaintiffs susceptibility to distress).
102. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 183. See infra notes 104-106 (recognizing variations among
jurisdictions applying the tort's elements).
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minds could differ as to the extremeness and outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct, 10 there is a variance among the jurisdictions as to
when reasonable minds could differ." 4 Some courts have rigidly applied
the extreme and outrageous conduct element to the facts, seemingly
requiring a pattern of bizarre behavior. 105 Other courts, evidently willing
to allow development of the tort in nontraditional instances, such as in the
employment context, have held that the extreme and outrageous conduct
element is a question for the jury in particular instances.1°6
103. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing courts' application of comment h
which provides for the roles of the judge and jur).
104. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 183 n.7, 184 n.8. To illustrate this acknowledged split among the
jurisdictions, the Swenson court provided cases from other jurisdictions which have addressed the
issue. Id. at 183-84.
105. Id. at 183 n.7 (citing cases applying the extreme and outrageous conduct test in the
employment context). See Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 803 F. Supp. 649, 673 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)
(concluding that harassing and taunting by supervisors would not be sufficient as a matter of law to
state a claim, even though such a claim was not available to claimant because he was an at-will
employee); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that age discrimination was not extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law);
Katzer v. Baldor Electric Co., 969 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1992) (deciding that firing an employee
because of a handicap was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of lawY; Meek v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co., 483 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that sexist remarks and
religious degradation by a supervisor were not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law); Wilson v.
Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that because the experienced
employee of thirty years was stripped of his duties and demoted to an ent level position, defendant's
conduct avoided summary judgment, but that the decision may have been different without the
employee's vast experience); Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1389 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that racial slurs or demotion were not extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of
law); James v. International Business Machines Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1420, 1429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(stating that even if the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim were not barred by workers'
compensation, discriminatory conduct alone would not be extreme and outrageous conduct as a
matter of law); Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 521 (App. Div. 1989) (holding
that racial slurs, religious discrimination, and gender discrimination were not extreme and outrageous
conduct as a matter of law); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1989)
(finding that harassment by the employer was not extreme and outrageous conduct, but denying
summary judgment because the plaintiff had been set up for a crime); Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp.
426,433-34 (E.D. Pa 1983) (terminating plaintiff on the basis of age discrimination was not extreme
and outrageous conduct as a matter of law).
106. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 184 n.8 (citing cases that allowed "evidence of most any type of
discrimatory conduct" to ross the summasy udgement threshold). See Mass v. Martin Marietta
Corp.. 805 F. Supp. 1530, 1543-44 (D. Colo. 1992) (allowing alleged racial comments to pass
summary judgment); Dreith v. National Football League, 777 F. Supp. 832, 838-39 (D.Colo. 1991)
(determining whether age discrimination was extreme and outrageous conduct was an appropriate
juy question); Woods v. Craphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding
racial discrimination as extreme and outrageous conduct); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F.
Supp. 994, 1003 (W.D. Trex. 1990) (denying summary judgment on the basis of discrimination);
Franklin v. Portland Community College. 787 P.2d 489. 493 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a
continuing pattern of discrimination and racial epithets was sufficient for denying summary
judgment; Beeman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 674, 680-81 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (stating that
subtle gender discrimination raised a jury question); Butler v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 690 F.
Supp. 424, 430 (D. Md. 1987) (stating that discriminatory conduct should be a jury question);
Robinson v. Hewlett Packard Corp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 591, 603-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
conduct including racial slurs was a question to be presented to the jury); Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d
916, 922 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that racial discrimination was an issue for the jury); Agarwal v.
Johnson. 603 P.2d 58, 66-67 (Cal. 1979) (allowing the plaintiff to show less outrageousness than
traditionally required to meet the threshold extreme and outrageous requirement; Contreras v.Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1176-77 (Wash. 1977) (finding that the employer's ridiculing
the plaintiff's race created a jury question); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 408 P.2d 216, 218-19
(Cal. 1970) (holding that discriminatoy conduct directed at employee was a question for the jury).
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When the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the emo-
tional distress claim could not be dismissed as a matter of law, it reiter-
ated that the decision would be "praised by some jurisdictions [but] much
criticized by others."'0 7 The court adopted the more persuasive view
which was more attuned to social conditions and awareness.'"9 The
North Dakota Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Erickstad,
stated that "in modem-day America, we realize that not only are all peo-
ple created equal, but that the trend in the courts ... is to expand upon
that principle."'' 3°
In a special concurrence, Justice Levine alluded that the presence of
alleged gender discrimination with nothing more may be enough to avoid
summary judgment and raise a jury question." 0 Justice Levine expanded
on the policy acknowledged by the majority that society is constantly
changing so that "former custom does not prevent present practice from
constituting extreme and outrageous conduct.""' Justice Levine dis-
cussed two factors in determining whether gender discrimination was to
be considered intolerable in a civilized society: the act of gender discrimi-
nation and its impact on the victim." 2 To Justice Levine, gender discrim-
ination is outrageous because it "strips its victim of self-esteem, self-
confidence[,] and self-realization."" 3  Justice Levine emphasized the
importance of a court denying summary judgment and giving the deter-
mination of outrageous conduct to a jury in this instance because if rea-
sonable judges could disagree as to whether or not gender discrimination
was outrageous, then reasonable jurors could, too." 4
Present Chief Justice VandeWalle dissented to the majority's lenient
application of the outrageousness requirement." 5 He contended that the
107. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 186.
108. Id.
109. Id. Chief Justice Erickstad noted that this trend is reflected in North Dakota caselaw. Id.
(citing Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 88, 90 n.2 (N.D. 1992) (recognizing that both wives and
husbands may bring a claim for loss of spousal consortium); Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245, 247-49
(N.D. 1982) (stating that an economic partnership exists in a manrriage); Hastings v. James River Aerie
No. 2337, Etc., 246 N.W.2d 747, 749-52 (N.D. 1976) (recognizing that it would be unconstitutional to
treat spouses differently in claims for loss of spousal consortium)).
110. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 187 (Levine, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 188. To exemplify her approach, Justice Levine provided an example of changing
social mores from the 1873 case Bradwel v. Illinois, in which a woman could not practice law as a
matter of law solely because of her gender. Id. at 187-88 (Levine, J., concurring) (citing Bradwell v.
Illinois, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1873), and stating that surely a 1993 jury would find the exclusion in Bradwell
v. Illinois outrageous).
112. Id. at 188. Justice Levine stated that "sex discrimination debases, devalues, and despoils."
Id. She analogized being discriminated against on the basis of gender to being struck with lightning
twice, once by the irrational gender-based discriminatory conduct and once again by the inability to
do anything about it. Id.
113. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 188 (Levine, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 188-89 (Levine, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 189-90 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice VandeWalle became the Chief
Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court after Swenson was heard.
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court's decision was a deplorable deviation from the Muchow standards
and would inevitably expand the scope of the tort. 16  Chief Justice
VandeWalle was apprehensive that the majority's decision would make
almost every claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress a jury
question provoking unwarranted verdicts promulgated by sympathy for
the plaintiff." 7  Relaying his apprehension, the Chief Justice expressed
his great concern that the tort would not only expand to sexual harass-
ment cases, but to cases invoking conduct which society considered to be
"unacceptable," yet not meeting the Muchow standard as it has been
applied." 8
While it is apparent that the North Dakota Supreme Court has clari-
fied and expanded the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
North Dakota, the analyses of the opinions of the North Dakota Supreme
Court reflect the discourse among and within jurisdictions, as well as the
controversial policy which is involved with the tort.
IV. IMPACT
By allowing Swenson to present her circumstances to a jury, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has directed the course North Dakota
courts will take in determining whether allegedly discriminatory conduct
in the workplace is sufficient to avoid summary judgment on an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim. Swenson permits the
independent tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to be
added to the arsenal of statutory claims prohibiting discrimination in the
116. Id. at 190. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84 (discussing the Muchow standard as
invoked in Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989)).
117. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 190 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). Rather than looking at
contemporary standards in the workplace, Chief Justice VandeWalle endorsed applying the more rigid
standards delineated in Muchow, consistently with the historical characterization of outrageousness.
See id.
118. Id The Chief Justice asserted that he was not encouraging either condonance or toleration
of gender discrimination but only that Krabseth's conduct could not as a matter of law fit the
definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress as defined in Muchow. Id. Although the
temptation 'to let the end justify the means" was present for Chief Justice VandeWalle, it was "not
good policy' for the Chief Justice. Id.
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workplace." 9 Other jurisdictions might have come to the opposite con-
clusion with the Swenson fact pattern. 120
The decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court will have an
impact on employment relationships. The decision will impact not only
the manner in which an employer conducts himself or herself with his or
her employees, but also the manner in which an employer's attorney will
advise employers. Attorneys must inform their employer-clients of statu-
tory requirements as well as their potential exposure to an intentional
infliction of emotional distress state tort claim.
Awareness and prevention are the policies behind this decision which
will undoubtedly act as a deterrence for discrimination. The employer
must be aware of the content and context of his or her conduct. The
danger of liability may encourage changes in the demeanor some employ-
ers exhibit towards employees. Unless the employer wagers that his or
her peers would consider the conduct and context socially tolerable, to
prevent liability, the employer must be cognizant of his or her conduct
and the employee's susceptibility to distress.
Although Swenson pertained to the employment relationship, a
potential for expansion of the relationship concept exists in circumstances
in which actual or apparent authority of one person over another is pres-
ent. Other jurisdictions have applied the relationship concept to police
officers, school authorities, landlords, and collecting creditors.'12
In addition to broadening the scope of Swenson by applying the rela-
tionship factor to relationships other than employment relationships, the
Swenson analysis may be applied to modified fact patterns, such as when
two of the three factors considered in Swenson are present but the third is
lacking. For example, suppose discriminatory conduct and a relationship
existed between the defendant and plaintiff, but no knowledge of a sus-
ceptibility was offered. The court has not answered whether such an
119. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 14-02.4 (Supp. 1993) (also known as the North Dakota
Human Rights Act). The statutory framework which denied Swenson recovery because of the
statutory requirements has since been amended to more liberally provide recovery or parties seeking
redress. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 190 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice VandeWalle
expressed concern that the unwarranted recognition of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Swenson's instance was simply a means for the majority to give Swenson a vehicle by which
she could recover damages for Krabseth's alleged conduct toward her. Id. Chief Justice VandeWalle
reiterated that by enacting the North Dakota Human Rights Act, the North Dakota Legislature had
properly designated a remedy for such alleged conduct. Id. See generaly Nicholas W. Chase,
Comment, Civil Rights-Employment Discrimination: Modifying Federal Standards to Reflect
Principles of State Law: The North Dakota Supreme Court's Examination of the Hicks Rationale
Prompts the Court to Customize Its Own Standard to Review State-Based Employment
Discrimination Claims, 70 N.D. L REv. 207 (1994) (discussing claims brought pursuant to North
Dakota Human Rights Act).
120. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (describing the split among the
jurisdictions).
121. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing positions or relationships that
have lent themselves to liability in other jurisdictions).
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instance is sufficiently within the Swenson framework to avoid a summary
judgment or whether a lack of the factors considered in Swenson would
require an application of the seemingly more rigid Muchow standard."m
This potential application was left unresolved by the North Dakota
Supreme Court, but the composition of the North Dakota Supreme Court
has changed since the Swenson decision as well.1 3
If the court refuses to apply Swenson beyond its particular facts and
if the conduct is not of the requisite outrageousness to avoid summary
judgment for an independent tort claim, the emotional distress of the
claimant may nevertheless be considered when measuring damages for
other claims. Thus, a court would revert to the practice of considering
emotional distress as a "parasitic" damage.1 24
Because some issues were neither briefed nor argued to the court,
they were not considered by the court." z Therefore, the effect that the
unconsidered issues will have on later cases is uncertain. Other jurisdic-
tions have addressed some of the issues that were not discussed in Swen-
son with inconsistent results.12 6
122. See supra notes 115-118 (discussing Chief Justice VandeWalle's concern that Swenson will
greatly expand the tort). The Swenson analysis can be applied to facts similar to Muchow and adifferent outcome is plausible. To illustrate, Muchow involved a relationship of actual or apparent
authority between the plaintiffs and the police officer. See Muchow v. Lndblad, 435 N.W.2d 918,
919 (N.D. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt e (1965) (recognizing that police
officers hold positions of apparent or actual authority); see also supra note 84 (discussing Muclow's
facts). Knowledge of susceptibility was also present in Muchow because the officer knew that the
family was grieving the loss of a daughter. See Mchow, 435 N.W.2d at 919; see also upra note 84(discussing Muchow's facts). If the Swenson analysis were applied to the Muchow facts, it is plausible
that the family would have been able to bring its alleged facts to the jury (even though former Chief
Justice Erikstad distinguished Muchow because the police officer had knowledge of the decedent's
suicidal tendencies).
123. Chief Justice Erickstad, who wrote the opinion of the court, and Justice Phillip Johnson,who sided with the majority, are no longer on the North Dakota Supreme Court. They were repldby Justices Dale Sandstrm and William Neumann, who did not participate in the decision. JusticeLevine and Justice Meschke are the only members remaining on the court who concurred in the
decision. Chief Justice VandeWalle continues to serve on the court and was the sole dissenter in thedecision. Thus, the further development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress willbe impacted by the views of the new justices on the court and whether they agree with the direction
the tort has taken with Swenson.
124. See supra notes 39-41, 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing "parasitic" damages ingeneral and in North Dakota).
125. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins.. Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 187 n.10 (stating that issues not
considered by the court include the following: wrongful discharge, the exclusivity provision of theWorkers' Compensation Act, the exhaustion op administrative remedies, and the possible distinctions
between corporate liability and individual liability).126. See Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating thatdefendant's failure to take action against an employee who was a known sexual harasser of femalesconstituted direct liability for inaction on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Danielv. Magma Copper Co., 620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that because termination
was lawful, any recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon wrongful dischargemust also fail) Lag'es v. Copley, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the
plaintiff was not confined to the exclusive remedy of the state Workers' Compensation Act); Pavilon v.Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1249-50 (I1 Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the state Human Rights Actdid not preempt an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the tort furthered goalsin addition to those addressed by the Act); Batson v. Shiftt, 602 A.2d 1191, 1204 (Md. 1992)(providing that a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not preempted by federal
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In Swenson, the North Dakota Supreme Court has better defined
and molded the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. How-
ever, the jury must make the ultimate determination of outrageousness
based on its collective resolution of the threshold of societal tolerance, as
long as the court finds that reasonable minds may differ.
Angela M. Elsperger
labor law); Watte v. Maeyens, 828 P.2d 479, 481 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that although
terminating an employee without more does not constitute intolerable behavior, an employer's
conduct, in the course of termination, may rise to the level of outrageous behavior); Wornick Co. v.
Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. 1993) (holding that the employer was exercising legal rights, which
legally cannot constitute outrageous conduct); Commodore v. University Mechanical Constr., 839
P.2d 314, 322 (Wash. 1992) (ho ding that federal labor law does not preempt a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress). But see Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that failure of a Title VII claim necessarily precluded a state claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the factual predicate did not exist); Linebaugh v. Sheraton
Michigan Corp., 497 N.W.2d5 589 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that a corporate defendant was
liable oaly for the acts of its employees that were witin the scope of emploent, thus the summaryjudgment for the defendant corporation was proper); Shea v. Cornell Univ., 596 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504
(App. Div. 1993) (providing that conduct was covered by the statutory Human Rights law but was not
atrocious to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Venable v. GKN Automotive,421 S.E.2d 378, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs state claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was preempted by federal labor aw).

